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Abstract
We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multi-
winner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters—each voter approves
a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size k; the goal is to select a committee
(a subset) of k alternatives according to the preferences of the voters. We investigate a number
of election rules and ask whether the committees that they return represent the voters propor-
tionally. In contrast to the classic literature, we employ quantitative techniques that allow to
measure the extent to which the considered rules are proportional. This allows us to arrange the
rules in a clear hierarchy. For example, we find out that Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) has
better proportionality guarantees than its sequential counterpart, and that Phragme´n’s Sequen-
tial Rule is worse than Sequential PAV. Yet, the loss of proportionality for the two sequential
rules is moderate and in some contexts can be outweighed by their other appealing properties.
Finally, we measure the tradeoff between proportionality and utilitarian efficiency for a broad
subclass of committee election rules.
1 Introduction
An approval-based committee election rule (an ABC rule, in short) is a function that given a set ofm
candidates C (the candidates are also referred to as alternatives), a population of n voters—each ap-
proving a subset ofC—and an integer k representing the desired committee size, returns a k-element
subset of C. Committee election rules are important tools that facilitate collective decision making
in various contexts such as electing representative bodies (e.g., supervisory boards, trade unions,
etc.), finding responses to database querying [11, 26], suggesting collective recommendations for
groups [21, 22], and managing discussions on proposals within liquid democracy [4]. Further, since
committee elections are a special case of participatory budgeting (PB) [8, 14], good understanding
of ABC rules is a prerequisite for designing effective PB methods.
The applicability of various ABC rules often depends on the particular context, yet an important
requirement one often imposes on a committee election rule is that it should be fair to (groups of)
voters. While fairness is a broad concept putting various principles under the same umbrella, in
certain types o collective decision-making—specifically when the goal is to elect a committee—it
is often argued that a fair rule should be proportional1, as illustrated by the following example.2
1Other basic axioms describing fairness requirements are, for instance, anonymity or solid coalitions property [10].
2Indeed, proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are often argued to be more fair than non-proportional
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Example 1. Consider an election with 30 candidates, c1, c2, . . . , c30, and 100 voters having the
following approval-based preferences. The first 60 voters approve the subset C1 = {c1, . . . , c10};
the next 30 voters approveC2 = {c11, . . . , c20}, and the last 10 approveC3 = {c21, . . . , c30}. When
the size of the committee to be elected is 10, then a proportional rule should select a committee with
6 members coming from C1, 3 members coming from C2, and 1 member from C3.
Identifying a proportional committee in Example 1 was easy due to the voters’ preferences
having a very specific structure: each two approval sets where either the same or disjoint. In
the more general case, when the approval sets can arbitrarily overlap, the answer is no longer
straightforward. Several approaches to formalizing proportionality have been proposed in the litera-
ture [1, 2, 7, 12, 19, 24]. These approaches are all axiomatic—they formally define natural properties
referring to proportionality, and classify known rules based on whether they satisfy these axioms or
not. Thus, these approaches are qualitative, giving only a yes/no answer to the question of “Is a
given rule proportional or not?”. Hence, in essence, they are not capable of measuring the extent to
which proportionality is satisfied or violated. This is a serious drawback since there is no single rule
satisfying all the desired properties, and the choice of the rule boils down to a judgment call. The
mechanism designer must decide on which properties she finds most critical and which tradeoff she
is willing to accept. However, in order to make such a decision one primarily needs to understand
these tradeoffs; in particular the extent of violations of certain properties.
In our study we employ a quantitative approach. For several rules of our interest we will de-
termine their proportionality degrees, i.e., we will assess the extent to which they satisfy propor-
tionality. Informally speaking, the proportionality degree of a rule is a function specifying how the
rule treats groups of voters with cohesive preferences, depending on the size of these groups. At the
same time, our proportionality degree has the form of a guarantee; it gives the best possible bounds
on the proportionality that the rule cannot violate, no matter what are the voters’ preferences.
Our definition of the proportionality degree is closely related to the concept proposed by
Skowron et al. [26]. In fact, their work establishes certain bounds on the proportionality degree
for a number of ABC rules. Unfortunately, these bounds cannot be used for comparing the rules,
since they are not tight; not even asymptotically. Our main contribution is that we derive new almost
tight bounds that allow to arrange the rules that we study in a clear hierarchy, based on how propor-
tional they are. A tight estimation of the proportionality degree is already known for Proportional
Approval Voting (PAV) [2]—we generalize this result and calculate the proportionality degree for
convex Thiele methods, a broad class of rules which—in particular—includes PAV. Additionally,
we find close estimations of the proportionality degree for two sequential methods often considered
in the literature: Sequential Proportional Approval Voting and Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. As far as the proportionality guarantees are con-
cerned, Sequential PAV is better than Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule; further, PAV is better than both of
the sequential rules. For reasonable committee sizes the proportionality degree of Sequential PAV is
no worse than 70% of the proportionality degree of PAV. The proportionality degree of Phragme´n’s
ones [15, 20]. Yet, the criticism of proportionality also appears in the literature, and it comes from the two main
directions—one stems from the analysis of voting power in the elected committees [13, 25]; the other one is grounded
in the arguments in favor of degressive proportionality [17]. Proportionality is also related to fairness in other domains,
such as allocation of individual [27] and public goods [12].
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Sequential Rule is roughly twice lower than that for PAV. On the one hand, our results suggest
that PAV should be preferred whenever proportionality is the primary goal. On the other hand, they
demonstrate that the loss of proportionality for Sequential PAV and Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule
is moderate. Thus, using these rules can be justified in cases when the decision maker considers
their other distinctive properties equally important to proportionality (in Sections 3 and 4 we briefly
recall a few arguments that sometimes can speak in favor of one of the two sequential rules).
Finally, in Section 6 we apply the same quantitative methodology to other criteria than propor-
tionality. Specifically, we focus on the utilitarian efficiency, measured as the total number of ap-
provals that the members of the elected committee obtain. We establish asymptotically tight bounds
on the loss of the utilitarian efficiency for convex Thiele methods. For Sequential PAV and for
Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule such bounds are already known [18]. Together with the aforementioned
proportionality guarantees, this allows to quantify the tradeoff between the level of proportionality
and utilitarian efficiency, that is to estimate the price of fairness for particular (classes of) rules.
Similar tradeoffs have been considered in the resource allocation domain [5, 9].
2 The Model
For each natural number p ∈ N, we set [p] = {1, 2, . . . , p} and [p]0 = {0, 1, 2, . . . , p}. For each
set X by Sp(X) we denote the set of all p-element subsets of X , and by S(X) we denote the
powerset of X , i.e., S(X) =
⋃|X|
p=0 Sp(X).
An approval-based election is a triple (N,C,A), where N = {1, 2, . . . n} is the set of voters,
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} is the set of candidates, and A is an approval-based profile (or, in short, a
profile), i.e., a function A : N → S(C) that maps each voter to a subset of C; intuitively, A(i) con-
sists of candidates that voter i finds acceptable and is referred to as the approval set of i. Whenever
we consider an election, we will implicitly assume that N and C refer to the sets of voters and
candidates, respectively. Similarly, we will always assume that n and m denote the number of vot-
ers and candidates, respectively. For the sake of the simplicity of the notation we will also identify
elections with approval-based profiles, assuming that the sets of voters and candidates are implicitly
encoded as, respectively, the domain and the range of A. We denote the set of all elections by A
(yet, following our convention, we will treat the elements of A as if these were simply profiles).
2.1 Approval-Based Committee Election Rules
An approval-based committee election rule (an ABC rule, in short) is a function R that for each
approval-based profile A and a positive integer k returns a nonempty set of size-k subsets of candi-
dates, i.e., R(A, k) ⊆ S(Sk(C)). We will refer to the elements of Sk(C) as to size-k committees,
or simply as to committees when the committee size k is known from the context. We will call the
elements ofR(A, k) winning committees.
Below, we recall definitions of several prominent (classes of) approval-based committee election
rules, often studied in the literature in the context of proportional representation.
Thiele Methods. For a function λ : N→ R the λ-Thiele rule is defined as follows. The λ-score that
a committee W ∈ Sk(C) gets from a voter i ∈ N is equal to scλ(W, i) =
∑|A(i)∩W |
j=1 λ(j).
3
The total λ-score of W is the sum of the scores that it garners from all the voters: scλ(W ) =∑
i∈N scλ(W, i). The λ-Thiele rule returns the committees with the highest λ-score.
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). PAV is the λPAV-Thiele rule for λPAV(i) = 1/i. Using the
harmonic sequence to compute the score ensures that PAV satisfies particularly appealing
properties pertaining to proportionality [1, 7, 19].
Sequential Proportional Approval Voting (Seq-PAV). This is an iterative rule that involves k
steps. It starts with an empty committee W = ∅ and in each step it adds to W the candi-
date that increases the PAV score of W most. Thus, intuitively, each voter starts with the
same voting power (equal to 1), which can decrease over time. When the voter gets her i-th
representative in the committee, then her voting power decreases from 1/i to 1/i+1.
Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule. This is also an iterative rule that is usually defined as a load balanc-
ing procedure. Each candidate c ∈ C is associate with one unit of load; if c is selected this unit
of load needs to be distributed among the voters who approve c. In each step the rule selects
the candidate that minimizes the load assigned to the maximally loaded voter. Formally, let
`i(t) be the load assigned to voter i after the t-th iteration. In each step t the rule selects a can-
didate c and finds a load distribution {δi(t)}i∈N such that: (i)
∑
i∈N δi(t) = 1, (ii) δi(t) ≥ 0
for each i ∈ N , (iii) δi(t) = 0 for each i /∈ N(c), and (iv) maxi∈N
(
`i(t − 1) + δi(t)
)
is
minimized. Finally, for each i ∈ N the rule updates the load, `i(t) = `i(t − 1) + δi(t). For
more discussion on the rule and its properties we refer the reader to the work of Brill et al. [6]
and to the survey by Janson [16].
2.2 Proportionality Degree of ABC Rules
This section defines and explains the notion of proportionality used in our comparative study.
Given an approval-based profile A and a desired committee size k ∈ N, we say that a group of
voters V ⊆ N is `-large if |V | ≥ `·nk . The satisfaction of the group V from a committeeW ∈ Sk(C)
is defined as the average number of representatives that a voter from V has in committee W :
satV (A,W ) =
1
|V |
∑
i∈V
|W ∩A(i)|.
Definition 1. We sat that a function g : N × N → R is a k-proportionality guarantee for an ABC
rule R if for each each approval-based profile A ∈ A, each `-large group of voters V ⊆ N , and
for each winning committee W ∈ R(A, k), the following implication holds:
|
⋂
i∈V
A(i)| ≥ g(`, k) =⇒ satV (A,W ) ≥ g(`, k).
Let us give an informal explanation of Definition 1; intuitively, this definition says that an `-large
group of voters is guaranteed g(`, k) representatives in the size-k committee elected by a rule R,
no matter what the voters’ preferences are. The average satisfaction of at least g(`, k) is guaranteed
only to `-large groups that have coherent enough preferences, that is for groups that agree on some
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g(`, k) common candidates. Indeed, it is clear that if each member of a group V approves different
candidates, then V cannot be satisfied by any rule; in fact we will call such V simply a set instead
of a group to indicate that there is no agreement between the voters in V , so they cannot be related
or grouped based of their preferences. Thus, summarizing, Definition 1 specifies how the rule treats
cohesive groups of certain size.
One intuitively expects that a proportional rule should have a guarantee of g(`, k) = `. In-
deed, a group V such that (i) |V | ≥ ` · nk , and (ii) |
⋂
i∈V A(i)| ≥ `, is large enough to deserve `
representatives in the elected committee, and choosing ` candidates that all members of the group
agree on is feasible. Unfortunately, such a guarantee is not possible to achieve. From the recent re-
sults of Aziz et al. [2] it follows that there exists no rule with the proportionality guarantee satisfying
g(`, k) > `−1. The same work proves that PAV has the proportionality guarantee of g(`, k) = `−1.
In order to facilitate our further discussion we define two related concepts.
Definition 2. Let k-Guar(R) be the set of all k-proportionality guarantees for a rule R. The k-
proportionality degree of an ABC ruleR is the function:
d
(k)
R (`, k) = sup
g∈k-Guar(R)
g(`, k).
In other words, the k-proportionality degree is the best possible k-proportionality guarantee one
can find for the rule. The proportionality degree of R is the function dR(`) = mink d(k)R (`, k), i.e.,
it defines the best possible guarantee that holds irrespectively of the size of the committee.
In the remainder of this section we compare our notion of the proportionality guarantee/degree
with other concepts pertaining to proportionality, studied in the literature.
Extended Justified Representation (EJR). EJR [1] requires that each `-large group of voters V
with |⋂i∈V A(i)| ≥ ` must contain a voter who approves at least ` members of the winning
committee(s). This property is very natural and interesting, yet it also has certain drawbacks.
On the one hand, it seems quite weak—it aims at analyzing how voting rules treat groups of
voters, yet for each group it only enforces the requirement that there must exist some voter in
the group who is well represented. On the other hand, it appears very strong—if each voter
from V approves `− 1 members of the winning committee, then V already witnesses that the
rule violates the property. Indeed, PAV is almost the only natural known rule satisfying EJR.3
Our approach, on the other hand, provides a fine-grained guarantee on how well a given rule
represents certain groups of voters.
Our bounds are also stronger. Clearly, if the proportionality guarantee of a rule R satisfies
gR(`, k) > `− 1, then—by the pigeonhole principle—R also satisfies EJR. For the reverse
direction a weaker implication has been shown by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [24]: if a rule R
satisfies EJR, then it has the proportionality guarantee of gR(`) = `−12 .
3Other rules satisfying EJR are either very similar to PAV (e.g., the local search algorithm for PAV) or very technical
and specifically tailored to satisfy the particular property [2]
5
Uniform Proportionality. Definition 1 requires that the average satisfaction of the voters from
large, cohesive groups must be high enough. Instead, it seems natural to enforce this require-
ment for each member of these groups rather than on average. Such a definition is more
natural when we assume that the utilities of the voters are not transferable between the group
members.4 Unfortunately, such a definition would be much too strong to lead to any mean-
ingful results. Indeed, consider an election where n is even and m = n/2. Further, for each i
let N(ci) = {1, 2, . . . , n/2 − 1, n/2 + i}. For each i, the group N(ci) consists of half of the
population of the voters and agrees on a candidate. Thus, each such a group should be well
represented, even in a reasonably small committee. Yet, when we set k = m − 1, then for
each possible size-k committee W there exist a large group containing a voter who does not
approve anyone from W , hence any committee would violate the property.
Further, let us informally explain that Definition 1 is, to a certain degree, resilient to the afore-
mentioned problem of the transferability of utilities. For example, for ` ≥ 2 it is not possible
that the whole utility of an `-large group V is held by a small subgroup of the voters—say, for
the sake of concreteness, by less then |V |/2 of them. Indeed, if this were the case, then a large
subset of V (with |V | ≥ nk ) would have no (or very little) representatives. Yet, such a subset
would form an (`− 1)-large group, and so, by Definition 1, it had to be well represented.
Lower Quota. Another approach to investigating proportionality of ABC rules is to analyze how
they behave for certain structured preferences; for example, when the voters and the candi-
dates can be divided into disjoint groups so that each group of voters approves exactly one
group of candidates. Such profiles can be represented as party-list elections, and so the clas-
sic notions of proportionality for apportionment methods [3, 23] apply. For instance, it can be
shown that EJR generalizes the definition of lower-quota. Brill et al [7] discussed how differ-
ent ABC rules behave for such restricted preferences, and Lackner and Skowron [19] proved
that under certain assumptions the behavior of ABC rules uniquely extends from party-list
profiles to general preferences. Our study, on the other hand, answers whether the considered
rules still behave proportionally for general preferences.
Finally, let us note that Skowron et al. [26] studied the proportionality degree of a number of
ABC rules, focusing on those that satisfy the committee enlargement monotonicity. However, their
estimations are not asymptotically tight, and are not sufficient to compare the studied rules. E.g., for
the Phragme´n’s rule, they showed that dPhrag(`) ≥ `(`+1)5k ; we will strengthen this result by showing
that dPhrag(`) = `2 ± 12 (note that k ≥ `, and that for “small” groups k is much greater than `).
3 Proportionality Degree of Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule
In this section we establish the proportionality degree of the Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule. However,
we first provide an alternative definition of the rule that will be more convenient to work with. Ac-
cording to our new definition the voters gradually earn virtual money (credits) which they then use
4We thank Je´roˆme Lang for suggesting this approach and for fruitful discussions on different notions of proportional-
ity.
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to buy committee members. Specifically, we assume that each voter earns money with the constant
speed of one credit per one time unit. Buying a candidate costs n credits, and a voter pays only for
a candidate that she approves of. We say that a candidate c is electable if c is approved by the voters
who altogether have at least n credits. In the first time moment when there exists an electable can-
didate c the rule adds this candidate to the committee (ties are broken arbitrarily) and resets to zero
the credits of all voters who approve c—intuitively, these voters pay the total amount of n credits
for adding c to the committee. The rule stops when k candidates are selected.
Let us now argue that the so-described process is equivalent to the Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule.
First, it is apparent that in the original definition of the Phragme´n’s rule we can assume that each
candidate is associated with n units of load instead of one. When a candidate c is selected then
its load is distributed so that all the voters who approve c have the same total load, which is the
maximum load among all the voters. The same candidate would be selected by the above described
process, and each voter v approving c would pay for c the number of credits which is equal to the
difference between its current total load and the previous one (just before c was selected).
Using the new definition allows us to obtain a new accurate estimation of the proportional-
ity degree for the Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule. Informally speaking, our guarantee says that the
Phragme´n’s rule can be at at most twice less proportional than PAV. The crucial element of the
proof is the analysis of a certain potential function. Intuitively, this function measures how unfair
the committee iteratively built by the Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule can be; we will show that (i) this
unfairness cumulates, and that (ii) eventually the accumulated unfairness must be used to compen-
sate the voters who got less representatives than they deserved. (The most difficult part of the proof
was coming up with its high-level idea and finding the right potential function.)
Theorem 1. The proportionality degree of Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule satisfies dPhrag(`) ≥ `−12 .
Proof. In the proof we will be using the alternative definition of the Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule,
using the concept of virtual money (credits).
Let W be a committee returned by Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule. For the sake of contradiction,
let us assume that there exists an `-large group of voters V with |⋂i∈V A(i)| ≥ `−12 and with the
average satisfaction lower than `−12 . We set nV = |V |.
Observe that the rule stops after at least k time units. Indeed, the total amount of credits earned
by all the voters in the first k time units is equal to kn. This allows to buy at most k candidates.
The total amount of credits collected by the voters from V in the first k time units is equal
to nV k. The number of credits left after the whole committee is elected is at most equal to n (other-
wise, these credits would have been spent earlier for buying an additional candidate approved by all
the voters from V ; such a candidate would exist as |⋂i∈V A(i)| ≥ `−12 and satV (A,W ) ≤ `−12 ).
Thus, the voters from V spent at least nV k − n credits for buying candidates they approve.
We now move to the central argument of the proof—we will estimate how much on average a
voter from V pays for buying a committee member. Our arguments are based on the analysis of a
potential function, defined as follows.
Let pt(i) denote the number of credits held by voter i ∈ V at time t; further, let pt(av) =
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nV
∑
i∈V pt(i). For a time t we define the potential value φt as:
φt =
∑
i∈V
(
pt(i)− pt(av)
)2.
We will now analyze how the potential value changes over time. First, observe that the potential
value remains unchanged when the number of credits of each voter is incremented (earning credits
does not change the potential value). Next, we analyze what happens when the voters use their
credits to pay for the committee members that they approve. Consider the time moment t when
a new committee member c is selected. The voters who approve c pay for her with their credits;
furthermore, a voter who pays uses all her available credits. We consider these voters separately,
one by one. Consider a voter j ∈ V and assume that her number of credits decreases to 0 (since we
consider the voters separately, the number of credits held by each other voter remains unchanged).
In such a case the average pt(av) decreases by
pt(j)
nV
. We assess the change in the potential value:
∆φ =
∑
i∈V,i 6=j
(
pt(i)−
(
pt(av)− pt(j)
nV
))2
+
(
0−
(
pt(av)− pt(j)
nV
))2
−
∑
i∈V
(
pt(i)− pt(av)
)2
=
∑
i∈V
(
pt(i)−
(
pt(av)− pt(j)
nV
))2
−
∑
i∈V
(
pt(i)− pt(av)
)2
+
(
pt(av)− pt(j)
nV
)2
−
(
pt(j)−
(
pt(av)− pt(j)
nV
))2
=
∑
i∈V
pt(j)
nV
(
2pt(i)− 2pt(av) + pt(j)
nV
)
− pt(j)2 + 2pt(j)
(
pt(av)− pt(j)
nV
)
Now, observe that
∑
i∈V (2pt(i)− 2pt(av)) = 0, thus:
∆φ =
pt(j)
2
nV
+ pt(j)
(
2pt(av)− 2pt(j)
nV
− pt(j)
)
= pt(j)
(
2pt(av)− pt(j)(nV + 1)
nV
)
.
We further observe that in each time t we have pt(av) ≤ nnV ≤ k` as otherwise the sum of credits
within the group would be greater than n, and such credits would be earlier spent for buying a
committee member who is approved by all the voters within the group.
Let us now interpret the above calculations. Intuitively, we will argue that a voter from V will
on average pay at most 2nVnV +1 · k` for a committee member. Let us set xt,j = pt(j)−
2nV
nV +1
· k` . Then,
∆φ = pt(j)
(
2pt(av)− 2k
`
− xt,j(nV + 1)
nV
)
≤ −xt,j(nV + 1)
nV
· pt(j).
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If xt,j > 0, then φ decreases by at least 2|xt,j | · k` . Similarly, if xt,j ≤ 0, then φ increases by at
most 2|xt,j | · k` . Since, the potential value is always non-negative, we infer that the values of xt′,j′
for j′ ∈ V and t′ are on average lower than or equal to 0. Recall that pt(j) in the definition of xt,j is
equal to how much voter j pays for the selected candidate. Thus, the voters from V on average pay
at most 2nVnV +1 · k` < 2k` for a committee member. Consequently, the average number of committee
members that the voters from V approve is at least equal to:
nV k − n
2k
` · nV
=
k
2k
`
− n
2k
` · nV
≥ `
2
− n
2k
` · n`k
=
`− 1
2
.
This leads to a contradiction and so completes the proof.
Proposition 1 below upper-bounds the proportionality degree of Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule.
For the sake of simplicity we present the proof for the case when k is divisible by `; an analo-
gous construction holds also in the general case (with slightly worse, but asymptotically the same,
bounds), but the analysis is more complex.
Proposition 1. The k-proportionality degree of Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule satisfies the following
inequality: For each k, ` ∈ N, ` < k2 and k divisible by ` we have d
(k)
Phrag(`, k) ≤ `2 · 2k−2`+22k−3` .
Proof. Let us fix two natural numbers, `, k ∈ N; ` < k2 and k is divisible by `. Let x = 2(k−`)` − 1
and let L be an integer divisible by `, x, and by k. We construct a profile with n = Lk` voters and
2k + ` candidates C = {b1, . . . , bk, c1, . . . , ck, d1, . . . , d`}, as follows:
N(b1) = {1, 2, . . . , L/x} ∪ {L+ 1, L+ 2, . . . , n− L/x},
N(b2) = {L/x + 1, . . . , 2L/x} ∪ {L+ 1, L+ 2, . . . , n− 2L/x},
. . .
N(bx) = {L− L/x + 1, . . . , L} ∪ {L+ 1, . . . , n− L},
N(bx+1) = {1, 2, . . . , L/x} ∪ {L+ 1, . . . , n− L},
N(bx+2) = {L/x + 1, . . . , 2L/x} ∪ {L+ 1, . . . , n− L},
. . .
N(bk) =
(
a cyclic shift of {1, 2, . . . , L/x}) ∪ {L+ 1, . . . , n− L}
N(c1) = . . . = N(ck) = {n− L, n− L+ 1, . . . , n}
N(d1) = . . . = N(d`) = {1, . . . , L}.
In particular, candidate b1 is approved by n−L voters in total, b2 is approved by n−L−L/x voters,
and b3 by n− L− 2L/x voters. Each candidate from {bx, . . . , bk} is approved by the same n− 2L
voters from {L + 1, . . . , n} and by some L/x voters from {1, . . . , L}, which cyclically shift. The
voters from {1, . . . , L} who approve bi, i ≥ x are those who are right after the voters who approve
bi−1-th candidate, unless those who approve bi−1 form the last segment, i.e., {L− L/x+ 1, . . . , L}.
In such a case, the voters from {1, . . . , L} who approve bi are exactly {1, 2, . . . , L/x}.
Let t = kk−` ; this ensures that t(n − L) = kk−`
(
n− n `k
)
= n. In our profile Phragme´n’s
Sequential Rule selects b1 first at time t. Indeed, at this time the group of voters N(b1) collects
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(n − L)t = n credits. At time 2t each voter from {L/x + 1, . . . , 2L/x} has already 2t credits, and
each voter from {L+ 1, L+ 2, . . . , n− 2L/x} has t credits; altogether, they have n credits, thus b2 is
selected second. By a similar reasoning, we infer that in the first x steps candidates b1, . . . , bx will
be selected by Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule, and the last one of them will be selected at time xt. At
this time the rule would also select one candidate from {c1, . . . , ck}. Indeed, at time xt the voters
from n− L, n− L+ 1, . . . , n have the following number of credits:
L
x
· t · (1 + 2 + . . .+ x) = L
x
· k
k − ` ·
x(x+ 1)
2
=
n`(x+ 1)
2(k − `) = n.
Let us now analyze what happens in the next steps. First, let us consider how the Phragme´n’s
Sequential Rule would behave if there were no candidates from {c1, . . . , ck}. At time (x+1)t voters
from {1, 2, . . . , L/x} have xt credits each. Similarly, each voter from {L/x+1, . . . , 2L/x} has (x−1)t
credits, each voter from {2L/x + 1, . . . , 3L/x} has (x − 2)t credits, etc. The amount of credits held
by the voters from {1, 2, . . . , L} altogether at time (x+ 1)t is:
L
x
· t1 · (1 + 2 + . . .+ x) = n.
At the same time voters from N(bx+1) have n credits altogether, thus, bx+1 can be selected next,
before any candidate from D = {d1, . . . , dk} is chosen5. Similarly, at time (x + 2)t each voter
from {1, 2, . . . , L/x} has t credits, each from {L/x + 1, . . . , 2L/x} has xt credits, each from {2L/x +
1, . . . , 3L/x} has (x − 1)t credits, etc.; altogether they have at most n credits, and the voters from
N(bx+2) have exactly n; thus bx+2 can be selected next. Through a similar reasoning we conclude
that in the first k steps Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule would select candidates {b1, . . . , bk}.
Now, consider the candidates from {c1, . . . , ck}. After candidates b1, . . . , bx are selected, candi-
dates from {c1, . . . , ck} are approved only by voters who do not approve other remaining candidates.
Thus, their selection does not interfere with the relative order of selecting the other candidates. Fur-
ther, observe that over time (x+ 1)t the last L voters collect the following number of credits:
(x+ 1)tL =
2(k − `)
`
· k
k − ` · n
`
k
= 2n.
Thus, every (x+1)t2 time moments the rule will select one candidate from {c1, . . . , ck}. Conse-
quently, in the first t(k−
⌊
2k−2x
x+3
⌋
) time moments, the rule will select at least
⌊
2k−2x
x+3
⌋
+1 candidates
from {c1, . . . , ck}. Indeed, the first candidate will be selected after the first xt time moments. After
the remaining t(k − x − b2k−2xx+3 c) time moments the number of candidates from {c1, . . . , ck} that
will be selected is equal to:
t(k − x− b2k−2xx+3 c)
(x+1)t
2
≥ 2(k − x−
2k−2x
x+3 )
x+ 1
=
2k − 2x
x+ 3
≥
⌊
2k − 2x
x+ 3
⌋
.
5Here we assume adversarial tie breaking, yet the construction can be strengthen so that it does not depend on the
particular tie-breaking mechanism.
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Next, observe that:⌊
2k − 2x
x+ 3
⌋
+ 1 ≥
⌊
2k − 4k−6``
2k−3`
` + 3
⌋
+ 1 =
⌊
2k`− 4k + 6`
2k
⌋
≥ `− 1.
Consequently, the winning committee W has at most k − `+ 1 candidates from {b1, . . . , bk−1, bk}
and the other committee members are from {c1, . . . , ck−1, ck}.
The group of voters V = {1, . . . , L} is `-cohesive. Let us assess their average number of rep-
resentatives. Observe that, except for candidates from {c1, . . . , ck−1, ck}, each candidate from the
selected committee is approved by exactly Lx voters of V . Thus:
1
|V |
∑
i∈V
|W ∩A(i)| = 1
L
· L
x
· (k − `+ 1) = `
2
· 2k − 2`+ 2
2k − 3` .
Next, observe that for large enough k the proportionality guarantee from Proposition 1 can be
arbitrarily close to /`2. Thus, we obtain the following corollary, which shows that the guarantee from
Theorem 1 is almost tight (up to the constant of 1/2).
Corollary 1. The proportionality degree of Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule satisfies dPhrag(`) ≤ `2 .
Let us now discuss the consequences of our results from the perspective of a decision maker
facing the problem of choosing the right rule. First, Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule offers a consid-
erably lower proportionality guarantee than PAV, hence the latter should be recommended when-
ever proportionality is the primary concern. Second, the worst-case loss of proportionality for the
Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule is moderate. Thus, in some cases this loss can be compensated by
other appealing properties of the rules. For example, Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule satisfies com-
mittee enlargement monotonicity, which makes it applicable when the goal is to compute a repre-
sentative ranking of alternatives (the recent work of Skowron et al. [26] discusses several domains
where finding proportional rankings is critical). Further, as discussed by Janson [16, Examples 13.5],
Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule has the following appealing property:6
Definition 3 (Strong Unanimity). An ABC rule R satisfies strong unanimity if for each approval-
based profile A such that there exists a candidate c who is approved by all the voters, it holds that
R(A, k) = R(A−c, k − 1) ∪ {c}, where A−c denotes the profile obtained from A by removing c
from the approval sets of all the voters.
It easily follows from the definition that Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule satisfies strong unanimity.
Further, this property is so natural, that it is quite surprising that PAV does not satisfy it (this is
an argument often raised by the critics of PAV). Theorem 1 quantifies the loss of proportionality
being the result of imposing strong unanimity and committee enlargement monotonicity, and as
such allows to view Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule as an appealing alternative for PAV (depending on
how important the decision maker considers particular axioms).
6We thank Dominik Peters for suggesting the property and for fruitful discussions on its consequences.
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4 Proportionality Degree of Sequential PAV
In this section we will assess the proportionality degree of Sequential PAV, focusing on comparing
Seq-PAV with Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule. Our method here is quite different from the one we
used in the previous section. Specifically, instead of proving a bound on the proportionality degree
of Seq-PAV directly, we will show how to construct an algorithm that given a desired committee
size k finds in polynomial time an upper bound on the k-proportionality degree of the rule. We will
compute these bounds for k ≤ 133 and will argue that they are fairly accurate.
Designing such an algorithm is not straightforward—the main challenge lays in reducing the
size of the space that needs to be searched. Indeed, even for a fixed committee size there is an
infinite number of possible profiles. Thus, we will use several observations that will allow us to
reformulate the problem and to compactly represent it as an instance of Linear Programming (LP).
Let us introduce some additional notation. Let A and k be an approval-based profile and a
desired committee size, respectively. Let Rseq-PAV(A, k) be a set of tied winning committees re-
turned by Sequential Proportional Approval Voting for A and k. For each winning committee
W ∈ Rseq-PAV(A, k) let clast(A,W ) denote the candidate that Sequential Proportional Approval
Voting has added to W as the last committee member. Let ∆seq-PAV(A, k,W ) denote the average,
per voter, marginal increase of the PAV score due to adding clast(A,W ) to W :
∆seq-PAV(A, k,W ) =
1
n
(
scorePAV(A,W )− scorePAV(A,W \ {clast(A,W )})
)
.
We denote the maximal possible such an average marginal increase as ∆seq-PAV(A, k):
∆seq-PAV(A, k) = max
W∈Rseq-PAV(A,k)
∆seq-PAV(A, k,W ).
Further, we define ∆seq-PAV(k) as:
∆seq-PAV(k) = sup
A∈A
∆seq-PAV(A, k).
Our first lemma shows a close relation between the proportionality guarantee of Sequential Propor-
tional Approval Voting and value ∆seq-PAV(k). This is very useful, as the definition of ∆seq-PAV(k)
is not based on `-large cohesive groups, and thus it is much easier to handle.
Lemma 1. The k-proportionality degree of Sequential PAV satisfies:
d
(k)
seq-PAV(`, k) ≥ ` ·
1
k ·∆seq-PAV(k) − 1.
The proportionality degree of Sequential PAV satisfies:
dseq-PAV(`) ≤ ` · 1
k ·∆seq-PAV(k) .
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Proof. First, we prove that the k-proportionality guarantee of Sequential Proportional Approval
Voting satisfies d(k)seq-PAV(`, k) ≥ ` · 1k·∆seq-PAV(k)−1. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that
this is not the case, and that there exists an approval-based profile A with n voters, a committee size
k, an `-large group of voters V with |⋂i∈V A(i)| ≥ ` · 1k·∆seq-PAV(k) − 1, and a winning committee
W ∈ Rseq-PAV(A, k) such that:
1
|V |
∑
i∈V
|W ∩A(i)| < ` · 1
k ·∆seq-PAV(k) − 1.
By the pigeonhole principle, there exist a candidate c /∈ W who is approved by all voters
from V . Let us now estimate by how much adding c to W increases the PAV score. Fixing the
average number of representatives that the voters from V have in W , it is straightforward to check
that the increase would be the smallest when each voter in V has roughly the same number of
representatives. Thus, adding c to W would increase the PAV score by more than
|V |
` · 1k·∆seq-PAV(k) − 1 + 1
= |V | · k
`
·∆seq-PAV(k) ≥ n∆seq-PAV(k).
Clearly, adding c to any subset of W would result in at least the same increase of the PAV score.
Since Sequential Proportional Approval Voting always selects a candidate that increases the PAV
score of the committee most, and since c was not selected, we infer that ∆seq-PAV(A, k,W ) >
1
n · n∆seq-PAV(k) = ∆seq-PAV(k), a contradiction.
Second, let us fix  > 0 and k ∈ N. We will construct an approval-based profile Ahard that
witnesses that dseq-PAV(`) ≤ ` · 1k·∆seq-PAV(k) + . Let A be an approval-based profile and W be a
size-k committee winning in A such that ∆seq-PAV(A, k,W ) > ∆seq-PAV(k)− 1, for some 1; the
value of 1 will become clear later on. Let us fix an integer L—intuitively, L is a large number; the
exact value of L will also become clear from the further part of the proof. Let n = |A|. We construct
Ahard by appending L independent copies of A (we clone both the voters and the candidates) and
y = Ln`Lk−` voters who all approve some ` candidates, not approved by any voter from any copy of
A—let us denote this set of y voters by V . Let n′ = |Ahard|; clearly n′ = Ln+ Ln`Lk−` = L
2nk
Lk−` . We
set the required committee size to k′ = Lk. Observe that V is `-cohesive. Indeed, all voters from V
approve common ` candidates; further the relative size of V , y/n′, is equal to
y
n′
=
Ln`
Lk − ` ·
Lk − `
L2nk
=
`
Lk
=
`
k′
.
Now, we show that the voters from V have on average less than `k·∆seq-PAV(k) +  representatives in
some winning committee for Ahard. Towards a contradiction, let us assume that this is not the case.
Since the voters in V are identical, this means that each such a voter has more than `k·∆seq-PAV(k) + 
representatives in each winning committee. Thus, for any winning committee, when the last repre-
sentative of the voters from V was added, the PAV-score of the committee increased by at most:
∆ = y · k ·∆seq-PAV(k)
`+ k ·∆seq-PAV(k)
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The above expression can be written as
∆ = y ·
(
k ·∆seq-PAV(k)
`
− 2
)
,
where 2 is some parameter dependent on  and k. Further, observe that:
lim
L→∞
∆ = lim
L→∞
y ·
(
k ·∆seq-PAV(k)
`
− 2
)
= lim
L→∞
Ln`
Lk − ` ·
(
k ·∆seq-PAV(k)
`
− 2
)
=
n`
k
·
(
k ·∆seq-PAV(k)
`
− 2
)
= n∆seq-PAV(k)− 2 · n`
k
.
Thus, there exists large enough L and small enough 1 such that:
∆ < n∆seq-PAV(k)− n1 < n∆seq-PAV(A, k,W ).
These are exactly the values of L and 1 that we use in our construction. In other words, the increase
of the PAV score due to adding the last representative of V is lower than the increase of the PAV
score due to adding the last committee member toW . Thus, clearly there exists a winning committee
that consists of some copies of the candidates from W and less than `k·∆seq-PAV(k) +  candidates
from those approved by the voters from V , a contradiction. This completes the proof.
As an immediate corollary of Lemma 1 we obtain an almost tight estimation of the proportion-
ality guarantee of Sequential Proportional Approval Voting.
Corollary 2. The proportionality guarantee of Sequential Proportional Approval Voting is
dseq-PAV(`) = infk
`
k·∆seq-PAV(k) +  for some  ∈ (−1, 0).
In the next part of this section we will focus on assessing the expression hseq-PAV(k) =
`
k·∆seq-PAV(k) , for different values of the parameter k. According to Lemma 1 this expression will
give us the lower bound on the k-proportionality degree and an upper bound on the proportionality
degree of Sequential PAV.
For each committee size k we can compute hseq-PAV(k) by solving an appropriately constructed
linear program; such an LP for each committee size k finds a profile A for which k ·∆seq-PAV(A, k)
is maximal. Designing such an LP however requires some care, since ideally its size should not
depend on the number of voters nor the number of candidates. Our first observation is that we can
consider only the profiles with k candidates (all of which form a winning committee). Indeed, if
we take a profile A that minimizes k ·∆seq-PAV(A, k), then we can remove from A all candidates
which are not members of the winning committee. After such a removal we obtain a profile that still
witnesses the minimality of k ·∆seq-PAV(A, k). Thus, we will assume that in the profile that we look
for there are k candidates, and we will represent them as integers from [k]. Further, without loss of
generality we will assume that the candidates are added to the winning committee in the order of
there corresponding numbers: candidate 1 is added first, candidate 2 is added second, etc.
Second, we observe that we do not need represent each voter, we can rather cluster the voters
into the groups having the same approval sets and for each possible approval set T ⊆ [k] we are
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maximize k ·
∑
T∈S([k])
xT · 1[k ∈ T ]|T |
subject to:
(a) :
∑
T∈S([k])
xT = 1
(b) :
∑
T∈S([k])
xT · 1[i ∈ T ]
|T ∩ [i]| ≥
∑
T∈S([k])
xT · 1[j ∈ T ]
|T ∩ ([i− 1] ∪ {j})| , i, j ∈ [k]; j > k
(c) : xT ≥ 0 , T ∈ S([k])
Figure 1: Linear programming (LP) formulation for computing hseq-PAV(k) = `k·∆seq-PAV(k) .
k lower-bound
1 1.0 `
2 1.0 `
3 0.8888 `
4 0.8571 `
5 0.8372 `
6 0.8169 `
k lower-bound
7 0.8064 `
8 0.7979 `
9 0.7888 `
10 0.7825 `
11 0.7773 `
12 0.7719 `
k lower-bound
13 0.7684 `
14 0.7647 `
15 0.7616 `
16 0.7589 `
17 0.7563 `
Table 1: A lower-bound on the k-proportionality degree of Sequential PAV.
only interested in the proportion of the voters who have this approval set. Such a proportion will be
denoted by the variable xT . In Figure 1 we give the LP; for a logical expression E, we set 1[E] to
be 1 if E is true, and 0 otherwise.
The expression that we maximize is exactly k ·∆seq-PAV(A, k). Indeed, 1[k∈T ]|T | is the marginal
increase of the PAV score coming from a voter who approves T , as a result of adding candidate k to
committee [k − 1]. The constraint (a) ensures that the proportions of clustered voters sum up to 1.
The constraint (b) ensures that in the i-th step of Sequential PAV, the marginal increase of the PAV
score due to adding i to committee [i− 1] is at least as large as due to adding j > i to [i− 1]. These
constraints ensure that the candidates are indeed added in the order 1, 2, . . . , k.
We computed the above program for k ≤ 17; the resulting lower bounds for the k-
proportionality degree of Sequential PAV are given in Table 1.
Let us compare the values from Table 1 with the bounds for the Phragme´n’s rule from Theorem 1
and Proposition 1. Since, the bounds for the Phragme´n’s rule are more accurate for smaller groups
of voters (when k is significantly larger than `), let us consider the committee size k = 10, and
an `-large group consisting of 10% of the voters (thus, ` = 1). In such a case, Proposition 1 says
that the k-proportionality degree of the Phragme´n’s rule cannot be higher than 0.625`, while the k-
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proportionality degree of Sequential PAV is at least equal to 0.7825`. This suggests that Sequential
PAV has better proportionality guarantees than the Phragme´n’s rule.
Unfortunately, the LP from Figure 1 is exponential in k, so we were able to provide accurate
bounds only for k ≤ 17. In the remaining part of this section we will describe another LP, that runs in
polynomial time in k. The new LP does not compute the exact value of hseq-PAV(k) = `k·∆seq-PAV(k) ,
but rather a lower bound for hseq-PAV(k). However, we will show that for small values of k (k ≤ 17)
this lower bound is very accurate. The new LP will allow us to compute the lower-bound on the k-
proportionality degree of Sequential PAV for k ≤ 120; we will see that for larger values of k this
bound is still considerably better than the upper-bounds for the Phragme´n’s rule.
In the new LP we use the same observations as before: (i) we consider profiles with k candidates
only, and (ii) we cluster the voters into groups, and for each group we have a variable denoting how
large it is as a fraction of all the voters. Specifically, we have the following variables. For each i ∈ [k]
we have a variable ai that denotes the fraction of voters who approve exactly i from all candidates
in total. For i ∈ [k], j, p ∈ [k]0 and p ≤ i, j, we have variable bi,j,p that denotes the fraction of
the voters who approve i candidates in total, and that after the j-th step of Sequential PAV approve
exactly p from the already selected committee members. Finally, i, j, p ∈ [k] and p ≤ i, j, we have
variable ci,j,p that denotes the fraction of voters who approve i candidates in total, and that as a
result of the j-th step of Sequential PAV the number of their representatives increased from p − 1
to p. Finally, for j ∈ [k] we have a variable dj that denotes the increase of the PAV score after the
j-th step of Sequential PAV, multiplied by 1/n. The new LP is given in Figure 2.
Let us now explain the constraints in the LP. Constraints (a1)-(a2) and (c1) are intuitive. Con-
straint (b1)-(b2) say that before Sequential PAV starts the committee is empty (and so every voter
in each group has no representatives) and that after Sequential PAV finishes, all the candidates are
selected (and so every voter in each group has as many representatives, as the number of approved
candidates). Constraint (c2) says that the voters whose number of representatives increased from
p−1 to p in the j-th step, must have had p−1 representatives after the (j−1)-th step of Sequential
PAV. Constraints (d1)-(d4) give the natural relations between b- and c- variables. Constraint (e1)
encodes the definition of the d-variables. Constraint (e2) is the most tricky, and it is an incarnation
of the pigeonhole principle. Consider the expression on the right-hand side of (e2). Consider the
voters who approve i candidates in total, and who before the j-th step of Sequential PAV, approve
p already elected members. There are bi,j−1,p such voters. Each such a voter approves i− p not yet
elected candidates. Adding each such a candidate would increase the score that each such a voter
assigns to a committee by 1p+1 . Thus, the sum in the right-hand side of (e2) gives the total, over all
not yet selected candidates, increase of the PAV score due to adding such candidates to the current
committee; the whole sum is normalized by 1/n. There are k − j + 1 not yet selected candidates.
Thus, by the pigeonhole principle, adding at least one of such candidate increases the normalized
PAV score by at least the value which is in the right-hand side of (e2). Since Sequential PAV selects
the candidate which increases the (normalized) PAV score most, we get Constraint (e2).
The LP from Figure 2 gives a set of constraints that each preference profile must satisfy. How-
ever, some solutions to the LP do not encode any valid profile; intuitively, the LP finds a solution
in a larger space than the space of all valid preference profiles. This is why it only provides a lower
bound for hseq-PAV(k), in contrast to the LP from Figure 1, which computes its exact value. Nev-
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maximize k · dk
subject to:
(a1) : ai ≥ 0 , i ∈ [k]
(a2) :
∑
i∈[k]
ai = 1
(b1) : bi,0,0 = bi,k,i = ai , i ∈ [k]
(b2) : bi,k,p = 0 , p < i
(c1) : ci,j,p ≥ 0 , i, j, p ∈ [k], p ≤ i, j
(c2) : ci,j,p ≤ bi,j−1,p−1 , i, j, p ∈ [k], p ≤ i, j
(d1) : bi,j,j = ci,j,j , i, j ∈ [k], j ≤ i
(d2) : bi,j,i = bi,j−1,i + ci,j,i , i, j ∈ [k], i ≤ j
(d3) : bi,j,0 = bi,j−1,0 − ci,j,1 , i, j ∈ [k]
(d4) : bi,j,p = bi,j−1,p − ci,j,p+1 + ci,j,p , i, j, p ∈ [k], p ≤ i− 1, j − 1
(e1) : dj =
∑
i∈[k]
∑
p≤i,j
ci,j,p
p
, j ∈ [k]
(e2) : dj ≥ 1
k − j + 1 ·
∑
i∈[k]
∑
p≤i,j−1
(i− p)bi,j−1,p
p+ 1
, j ∈ [k]
Figure 2: Linear programming (LP) formulation for computing a lower bound for hseq-PAV(k).
ertheless, as we will argue, the value computed by the LP from Figure 2 is accurate enough to
formulate interesting conclusions. Indeed, Table 2 provides the results of the computation of the
new LP for different values of k. One can observe that these values are very close to those from
Table 1, computed by the exact LP from Figure 1. For example, for k = 17, these values are 0.7563
and 0.7416, respectively. Further, in Figure 3, we depict these lower-bounds for k ≤ 133, and we
observe that they are considerably better than the bounds for the Phragme´n’s rule. Additionally, by
analyzing Table 1 and Table 2 we observe that the values computed by the two LP-s increase with
k; this allows us to conjecture that the actual k-proportionality degree of Sequential PAV is even
noticeably better than the bounds presented in Figure Figure 3.
Summarizing, Sequential PAV should be preferred over PAV and over the Phragme´n’s rule,
when proportionality and committee enlargement monotonicity are the primary requirements. On
the other hand, Sequential PAV does not satisfy strong unanimity—if a decision maker considers
this a serious flaw, then the Phragme´n’s rule is a good alternative.
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k lower-bound
1 1.0 `
2 1.0 `
3 0.8888 `
4 0.8461 `
5 0.8307 `
6 0.8131 `
k lower-bound
7 0.7952 `
8 0.7871 `
9 0.7771 `
10 0.7705 `
11 0.7643 `
12 0.7594 `
k lower-bound
13 0.7548 `
14 0.7512 `
15 0.7476 `
16 0.7441 `
17 0.7416 `
Table 2: A lower-bound on the k-proportionality degree of Sequential PAV, as computed by the
Linear Program from Figure 2.
5 Proportionality Degree of Thiele Methods
In this section we establish close estimations of proportionality degrees for a large subclass of Thiele
methods. In the next section we will analyze the same subclass from the perspective of utilitarian
efficiency. Our results will show that there is a whole spectrum of rules that implement different
tradeoffs between proportionality and utilitarian efficiency and will allow us to accurately quantify
these tradeoffs.
Theorem 2. Let λ : N → R be a non-increasing, convex function, and let g : N × N → R be a
function satisfying g(`, k) ≤ k, and the following inequality:
(k − g(`, k))λ(1 + g(`, k)) ≥ k − `
`
·max
x∈[k]
xλ(x) for each `, k ∈ [m], ` ≤ k. (1)
Then, the λ-Thiele rule has the k-proportionality guarantee of g.
Proof. Let W be a committee winning according to the λ-Thiele rule. Consider an `-large group of
voters V with |⋂i∈V A(i)| ≥ g(`, k), and for the sake of contradiction, assume that 1|V |∑i∈V |W ∩
A(i)| < g(`, k). From the pigeonhole principle we infer that there exists a candidate c /∈W who is
approved by each voter from V (and, possibly, by some voters outside of V ). Let us now estimate
the change of the λ-score due to replacing a committee member c′ ∈W with c:
∆(c, c′) ≥
∑
i∈V,c′ /∈A(i)
λ(|A(i) ∩W |+ 1)−
∑
i/∈V,c′∈A(i)
λ(|A(i) ∩W |).
Let us now assess the following sum:∑
c′∈W
∆(c, c′) ≥
∑
i∈V,c′∈W\A(i)
λ(|A(i) ∩W |+ 1)−
∑
i/∈V,c′∈W∩A(i)
λ(|A(i) ∩W |)
≥
∑
i∈V
(k − |A(i) ∩W |) · λ(|A(i) ∩W |+ 1)−
∑
i/∈V
|A(i) ∩W | · λ(|A(i) ∩W |)
≥
∑
i∈V
(k − |A(i) ∩W |) · λ(|A(i) ∩W |+ 1)− (n− |V |) ·max
x∈[k]
xλ(x).
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Figure 3: The lower bounds on the k-proportionality degree of Sequential PAV as computed by the
LP from Figure 2. The plot compares these lower-bounds with the bounds for the Phragme´n’s rule,
as given in Proposition 1.
From the Jensen’s inequality, we get that:
∑
i∈V
(k − |A(i) ∩W |)∑
i∈V (k − |A(i) ∩W |)
· λ(|A(i) ∩W |+ 1) ≥ λ
(∑
i∈V
(k − |A(i) ∩W |) · (|A(i) ∩W |+ 1)∑
i∈V (k − |A(i) ∩W |)
)
= λ
(
1 +
∑
i∈V (k − |A(i) ∩W |) · |A(i) ∩W |∑
i∈V (k − |A(i) ∩W |)
)
(from Chebyshev’s sum inequality, and by monotonicity of λ)
≥ λ
(
1 +
∑
i∈V (k − |A(i) ∩W |) ·
∑
i∈V |A(i) ∩W |
|V |∑i∈V (k − |A(i) ∩W |)
)
= λ
(
1 +
∑
i∈V |A(i) ∩W |
|V |
)
≥ λ(1 + g(`, k)).
Consequently, we get that:∑
c′∈W
∆(c, c′) ≥
∑
i∈V
(k − |A(i) ∩W |)λ(1 + g(`, k))− (n− |V |) ·max
x∈[k]
xλ(x)
> |V |(k − g(`, k))λ(1 + g(`, k))− (n− |V |) ·max
x∈[k]
xλ(x).
Since for each c′ ∈W we have that ∆(c, c′) ≤ 0, it holds that:
(n− |V |) ·max
x∈[k]
xλ(x) > |V |(k − g(`, k))λ(1 + g(`, k)),
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from which it follows that:
k − `
`
·max
x∈[k]
xλ(x) > (k − g(`, k))λ(1 + g(`, k)),
a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 gives a necessary condition for a function g to be a proportionality guarantee of
a λ-Thiele method. Proposition 2, below shows that a slightly weaker condition is also sufficient.
Thus, it shows that the bound obtained by solving (1) treated as an equality, gives an almost tight
guarantee. Consequently, Theorem 2 can be used to accurately estimate the proportionality degree
of any Thiele method that is based on a convex counting function.
Proposition 2. Let λ : N→ R be a non-increasing, convex function. The k-proportionality guaran-
tee g of the λ-Thiele rule must satisfy the following inequality:
(k − g(`, k))λ(g(`, k)) ≥ k − `
`
·max
x∈[k]
xλ(x+ 1) for each `, k ∈ [m], ` ≤ k.
Proof. Let y = argmaxi∈[k]iλ(i), and for the sake of contradiction, let us assume that for some
`, k ∈ [m], and for some  > 0 it holds that:
(k − g(`, k))λ(g(`, k)) +  < k − `
`
· yλ(y + 1).
To simplify the notation we set x = g(`, k). Clearly, x ≤ k. We rewrite the above inequality:
(k − x)λ(x) +  < k − `
`
· yλ(y + 1).
We will construct an instance of an election witnessing that g cannot be a proportionality guar-
antee of the λ-Thiele rule. Let C = B∪D be the set of candidates, where B = {b1, b2, . . . , bk} and
D = {d1, d2, . . . , dk}. We divide the voters into two disjoint groups, V and V ′, such that |V | = n· `k
and |V ′| = n− |V |. Without loss of generality, let us assume that n is divisible by k2. Each candi-
date b ∈ B is approved by all the voters from V . Candidate d1 is approved by the first |V |xk voters
from V and by the first |V ′| yk voters from V ′. The approval set of candidate di is constructed by
taking the |V |xk voters from V that appear right after the voters from V ∩ N(di−1) and by taking
|V ′| yk voters from V ′ that appear right after the voters from V ′ ∩N(di−1), taking the cyclic shift if
necessary. Finally, from the approval set of the last candidate dk we remove one arbitrary voter.
We will show that D is an optimal committee for this instance. For the sake of contradiction
assume that an optimal committee W contains z ≥ 1 candidates from B. Then, the voters from V
and V ′ approve on average xk (k − z) + z and yk (k − z) committee members, respectively. Since
λ is convex, given a constraint on the total number of committee members approved, the score of
a committee is maximized when the voters approve roughly the same number of candidates in W .
Thus, we can assume that each voter from V approves
⌊
x
k (k − z)
⌋
+ z or
⌈
x
k (k − z)
⌉
+ z members
of W and, analogously, that each voter from V ′ approves
⌊ y
k (k − z)
⌋
or
⌈ y
k (k − z)
⌉
members of
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W . Consequently, if we replace one candidate fromB with a candidate fromD inW , then the score
of the committee will change by:
∆ ≥ |V ′|y
k
λ
(⌈y
k
(k − z)
⌉
+ 1
)
−
(
|V | − |V |x
k
+ 1
)
λ
(⌊x
k
(k − z)
⌋
+ z
)
≥ |V ′|y
k
λ
(⌈y
k
· k
⌉
+ 1
)
−
(
|V | − |V |x
k
+ 1
)
λ
(⌊x
k
· k
⌋)
= |V ′|y
k
λ(y + 1)−
(
|V | − |V |x
k
+ 1
)
λ(x)
=
(
n− n `
k
)
y
k
λ(y + 1)− n `
k
(
1− x
k
+
k
n`
)
λ(x).
Since ∆ ≤ 0, we get that:
0 ≥ (k − `)yλ(y + 1)− `(k − x) · λ(x)− k
2
n
λ(x),
which is equivalent to:
(k − x) · λ(x) + k
2
n`
λ(x) ≥ k − `
`
yλ(y + 1).
By taking n large enough, so that k
2
n`λ(x) ≤ , we get a contradiction. Consequently, we get that D
forms a winning committee. Now, observe that V is `-large, and that |⋂i∈V A(i)| ≥ x. The average
number of representatives of V is however, lower than x. Thus, g is not a proportionality guarantee
for the λ-Thiele method. This gives a contradiction, and completes the proof.
Let us give an example application of Theorem 2, by considering λ√PAV(i) = 1/
√
i. In this case,
the inequality from Theorem 2 becomes:
k − `
`
·
√
k ≥ k − g(`, k)√
1 + g(`, k)
. (2)
Let us calculate a proportionality guarantee g√PAV for λ√PAV-Thiele method by solving (2) treated
as an equality, and picking the solution for g(`, k) that is no greater than k. We plot g√PAV in Fig-
ure 4. Interestingly, we can see that the loss of proportionality in comparison to PAV—especially for
reasonably large cohesive groups of voters—is moderate. This can justify using rules such as the
λ√PAV-Thiele method in some contexts. For instance, as we will see in the next section, such rules
guarantee much better utilitarian efficiency.
6 The Tradeoff Between Proportionality and Utilitarian Efficiency
In the previous sections we assessed the proportionality degree for a number of committee election
rules. Here, our goal is estimate the utilitarian efficiency of the considered rules. Together with our
previous results, this will allow us to express the studied rules as implementing certain tradeoffs
between proportionality and utilitarian efficiency.
21
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1k
-p
ro
po
rt
io
na
lit
y
(a
s
a
fr
ac
ti
on
of
k)
size of the group as the fraction of the number of voters
λ(i) = 1i
λ(i) =
(
1
i
)2/3
λ(i) = 1√
i
λ(i) = 1i2
Figure 4: The lower bounds on the k-proportionality degree of selected λ-Thiele rules.
We define the utilitarian efficiency of a rule as a lower bound on the ratio between the total
number of approvals that the candidates from the winning committee get from all the voters, to the
total number of approvals that any committee can possibly get. Formally:
Definition 4 (Utilitarian Efficiency). For a given committee size k an ABC ruleR has a utilitarian
efficiency guarantee of α if for each winning committee W ∈ R(A, k) we have:∑
i∈N
|A(i) ∩W | ≥ α · max
Wopt∈Sk(C)
∑
i∈N
|A(i) ∩Wopt|.
The next theorem gives a generic tool for calculating the utilitarian efficiency for a large subclass
of Thiele methods. In particular, Theorem 3 generalizes some known results from the literature—
an asymptotically tight utilitarian efficiency guarantee is already known for PAV and for the p-
geometric rule [18].
Theorem 3. Let λ : N → R be a non-increasing, convex function. For a committee size k, the
λ-Thiele rule has the utilitarian efficiency guarantee of α1+α > α− α2, for α defined as:
αλ(1) = λ (1 + kα) .
Proof. LetWR andWopt denote, respectively, the committee selected by ruleR, and the committee
maximizing the total utility of the voters. For each voter i ∈ N , let wi = |A(i) ∩WR|. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that WR 6= Wopt. Let c be the candidate that is approved by most
voters among the candidates from Wopt \WR, and let nc = |N(c)|. For each candidate c′ ∈WR let
∆(c, c′) denote the change of the total λ-score due to replacing c′ with c in committee WR. Since
WR is optimal according toR, we have that ∆(c, c′) ≤ 0 for each c′ ∈WR. Thus:
0 ≥
∑
c′∈WR
∆(c, c′) =
∑
c′∈WR
 ∑
i∈N(c)\N(c′)
λ(wi + 1)−
∑
i∈N(c′)\N(c)
λ(wi)

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=
∑
i∈N(c)
(k − wi)λ(wi + 1)−
∑
i/∈N(c)
wiλ(wi)
≥
∑
i∈N(c)
kλ(wi + 1)−
∑
i∈N
wiλ(max(wi, 1))
≥
∑
i∈N(c)
kλ(wi + 1)− λ(1)
∑
i∈N
wi.
Thus:
λ(1)
∑
i∈N
wi ≥
∑
i∈N(c)
kλ(wi + 1).
Since λ is convex, by the Jensen’s inequality we get that:
λ(1)
∑
i∈N
wi ≥ kncλ
1 + 1
nc
∑
i∈N(c)
wi
 .
Now, let us consider two cases. If
(∑
i∈N wi
) ≥ αknc, then the ratio of total utilities of Wopt
and WR is at most equal to:
τ =
∑
i∈N wi + knc∑
i∈N wi
≤ 1 + 1
α
=
1 + α
α
.
Thus, 1/τ is at least equal to α/1+α. Otherwise, i.e., when
(∑
i∈N wi
)
< αknc, we have that:
αλ(1) > λ
1 + 1
nc
∑
i∈N(c)
wi
 ≥ λ(1 + 1
nc
∑
i∈N
wi
)
≥ λ (1 + kα) ,
a contradiction. Thus, we get that only the first case is possible, and so the ratio of total utilities of
WR and Wopt is at least α/1+α.
Finally, the subsequent proposition provides an upper bound on utilitarian efficiency guarantees
of Thiele rules. In particular, these upper bounds confirm that the guarantees given in Theorem 3
are asymptotically tight up to a multiplicative factor of 2 (as we will show later on, usually we have
α = o(1), which gives the asymptotic tightness) .
Proposition 3. Let λ : N→ R be a decreasing, convex function. Let α ∈ R satisfy:
αλ(1) = λ (kα) .
For a committee size k, the utilitarian efficiency guarantee of the λ-Thiele rule is below 2α− α2.
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Proof. We construct an instance of election with a set of 2k candidates C = B ∪ D, where B =
{b1, . . . , bk}, and D = {d1, . . . , dk}. The voters are divided into two groups, V and N \ V , such
that |V |kα = n − |V |. Each voter from V approves all the candidates from B. The voters from
N \ V are divided into k equal-sized groups; each group approves one candidate from D so that
the approval sets of any two groups do not overlap. First, we will show that the elected committee
W for this instance has at most αk candidates from B. Indeed, if this were not the case, then by
replacing in W one candidate from B with a candidate from D we would change its score by:
∆ >
n− |V |
k
· λ(1)− |V |λ(kα) = |V |αλ(1)− |V |λ(kα).
Since ∆ ≤ 0, we get that:
λ(kα) > αλ(1),
a contradiction. Thus, W has at most kα candidates from B. Now, we assess the ratio τ of total
utilities of W and B:
τ ≤ αk · |V |+ (k − αk) ·
n−|V |
k
|V |k = α+
(n− |V |)(1− α)
|V |k = α+ α(1− α) = 2α− α
2.
This completes the proof.
E.g., from Theorem 3 and Proposition 3 it follows that the utilitarian efficiency of λ-Thiele
methods for λ(i) = 1i , λ(i) =
1√
i
and λ(i) = 1
i2
is, respectively, Θ
(
1√
k
)
, Θ
(
1
3√
k
)
, and Θ
(
1
k2/3
)
.
7 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the level of proportionality and the utilitarian efficiency for a number of mul-
tiwinner rules. We provide general tools that allow to estimate the proportionality degree and the
utilitarian efficiency for a large subclass of voting rules. Our results show, in particular, a spectrum
of rules that implement various tradeoffs between proportionality and utilitarian efficiency.
For specific rules our conclusions can be summarized as follows. Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule
is roughly twice less proportional than Proportional Approval Voting. Sequential PAV lies, in terms
of proportionality, between Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule and PAV. Further, some rules such as the
λ-Thiele rule for λ(i) = 1/
√
i offer a significantly better utilitarian efficiency than PAV, at the cost
of a moderate loss of proportionality.
We consider the following open question particularly interesting and important: can we find a
rule that combines the virtues of Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule and of PAV? Such a rule should in
particular (i) satisfy Pareto efficiency (which PAV satisfies and the Phragme´n’s rule violates [18]),
(ii) satisfy strong unanimity (which Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule satisfies and PAV violates), and
(iii) have a high proportionality degree. It is tempting to suggest a rule that first takes all unanimously
approved candidates and complements the committee by running PAV, yet such rule looks a bit
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artificial, and its definition is specifically tailored for strong unanimity7. Thus, finding stronger
properties that better capture the idea exposed by strong unanimity is essential.
Second, can we use Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule to compare any two committees? The defi-
nition of the rule allows only for finding winning committees. Comparing is, however, sometimes
essential, e.g., when there are some external constraints put on the committee and when the goal
is to find the best possible committee subject to these constraints. While Phragme´n proposed a few
other (seemingly similar) rules based on global optimization goals, these rules offer much worse
proportionality and utilitarian efficiency, so the question is still open.
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